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August 27, 2017November 23, 2021

Mortgage fraud is not victimless

Since the foreclosure crisis, there have been many enhancements to the mortgage process to deter fraud. Some of these changes include licensing of loan officers and indicating the license on government loans, choosing appraisers randomly, and limiting who can speak with appraisers. Fraud detection before and after settlement has also been improved to thwart criminals. But even with modern advancements, mortgage fraud has been trending upward.

Mortgage fraud schemes are increasingly sophisticated. You may think that that those who are involved in mortgage fraud are career criminals operating in remote areas. However, anyone can knowingly or unknowingly be involved, including real estate agents, attorneys, loan officers, appraisers, etc. And it can happen anywhere, even in your neighborhood. Where are is the most fraud trending? CoreLogic (corelogic.com) tracks fraud risk, and an interactive map can be found here.

Innocent consumers can get caught up in a mortgage fraud scheme too. Historically, home flipping schemes were the traps where unwitting home buyers would get cheated. However, since the foreclosure crises, distressed home owners have been a major target of mortgage modification scams.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi.gov) maintains that mortgage fraud is typically a material misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission in relation to getting a loan. It is also considered fraud to lie to influence a bank’s decision to approve a loan and/or to get favorable loan terms. The information you provide for your mortgage application should truthful. Even indicating falsely that you will be occupying the property after settlement to get a better interest rate, when your intention is to use it as a rental property, is mortgage fraud.

After the mortgage crisis, the FBI (and other law enforcement agencies) broadened the scope of mortgage fraud to include frauds targeting distressed home owners.

A recent conviction of local fraudsters detailed such a scheme. The co-conspirators claimed that they could help home owners modify mortgages and prevent foreclosure. Evidence presented during their trial showed that the scammers charged their victims upfront and monthly fees that were to be used to pay down mortgages as part of a “principal reduction” plan. Even though the victims received monthly invoices from the scammers showing their mortgage balances being paid down, there were no negotiations with lenders. Many victims lost their homes. The defendants will be sentenced later this year.

One of the most common tactics in mortgage fraud schemes is the use of a “straw buyer.” A straw buyer is often used by con artists as part of their mortgage fraud scheme to make the transaction appear legitimate. Although a straw buyer often knowingly consents to the use of their information to go along with the scheme, they are also sometimes the victim. A Baltimore real estate agent was sentenced earlier this year to twenty-seven months in prison, ordered to pay $735,363.47 restitution, as well as forfeit $962,274.95 for his part of a mortgage fraud scheme. The scheme used naïve and financially limited straw buyers to purchase renovated distressed properties at inflated prices, which the scammers profited. To facilitate the loan process, the conspirators gave false information to loan officers including the intent of buyers to use the property as their primary residence.

Mortgage fraud is not a victimless crime. Besides defrauding banks and their shareholders, mortgage fraud affects the neighborhood and community. Unwitting consumers who have been caught in scams are usually left holding the bag and are foreclosed. Residents of neighborhoods where mortgage fraud has occurred are affected by decreased home values and other effects of vacant and foreclosed homes.

Common mortgage fraud schemes listed by the FBI:

Foreclosure rescue schemes: The perpetrators identify homeowners who are in foreclosure or at risk of defaulting on their mortgage loan and then mislead them into believing they can save their homes by transferring the deed or putting the property in the name of an investor. The perpetrators profit by selling the property to an investor or straw borrower, creating equity using a fraudulent appraisal, and stealing the seller proceeds or fees paid by the homeowners. The homeowners are sometimes told they can pay rent for at least a year and repurchase the property once their credit has been reestablished. However, the perpetrators fail to make the mortgage payments and usually the property goes into foreclosure.

Loan modification schemes: Similar to foreclosure rescue scams, these schemes involve perpetrators purporting to assist homeowners who are delinquent in their mortgage payments and are on the verge of losing their home by offering to renegotiate the terms of the homeowners’ loan with the lender. The scammers, however, demand large fees up front and often negotiate unfavorable terms for the clients, or do not negotiate at all. Usually, the homeowners ultimately lose their homes.

Illegal property flipping: Property is purchased, falsely appraised at a higher value, and then quickly sold. What makes property flipping illegal is the fraudulent appraisal information or false information provided during the transactions. The schemes typically involve one or more of the following: fraudulent appraisals; falsified loan documentation; inflated buyer income; or kickbacks to buyers, investors, property/loan brokers, appraisers, and title company employees.

Builder bailout/condo conversion: Builders facing rising inventory and declining demand for newly constructed homes employ bailout schemes to offset losses. Builders find buyers who obtain loans for the properties but who then allow the properties to go into foreclosure. In a condo conversion scheme, apartment complexes purchased by developers during a housing boom are converted into condos, and in a declining real estate market, developers often have excess inventory of units. So developers recruit straw buyers with cash-back incentives and inflate the value of the condos to obtain a larger sales price at closing. In addition to failing to disclose the cash-back incentives to the lender, the straw buyers’ income and asset information are often inflated in order for them to qualify for properties that they otherwise would be ineligible or unqualified to purchase.

Equity skimming: An investor may use a straw buyer, false income documents, and false credit reports to obtain a mortgage loan in the straw buyer’s name. Subsequent to closing, the straw buyer signs the property over to the investor in a quit claim deed, which relinquishes all rights to the property and provides no guaranty to title. The investor does not make any mortgage payments and rents the property until foreclosure takes place several months later.

Silent second: The buyer of a property borrows the down payment from the seller through the issuance of a non-disclosed second mortgage. The primary lender believes the borrower has invested his own money in the down payment, when in fact, it is borrowed. The second mortgage may not be recorded to further conceal its status from the primary lender.

Home equity conversion mortgage (HECM): A HECM is a reverse mortgage loan product insured by the Federal Housing Administration to borrowers who are 62 years or older, own their own property (or have a small mortgage balance), occupy the property as their primary residence, and participate in HECM counseling. It provides homeowners access to equity in their homes, usually in a lump sum payment. Perpetrators taking advantage of the HECM program recruit seniors through local churches, investment seminars, and television, radio, billboard, and mailer advertisements. The scammers then obtain a HECM in the name of the recruited homeowner to convert equity in the homes into cash. The scammers keep the cash and pay a fee to the senior citizen or take the full amount unbeknownst to the senior citizen. No loan payment or repayment is required until the borrower no longer uses the house as a primary residence. In the scheme, the appraisals on the home are vastly inflated and the lender does not detect the fraud until the homeowner dies and the true value of the property is discovered.

Commercial real estate loans: Owners of distressed commercial real estate (or those acting on their behalf) obtain financing by manipulating the property’s appraised value. Bogus leases may be created to exaggerate the building’s profitability, thus inflating the value as determined using the ‘income method’ for property valuation. Fraudulent appraisals trick lenders into extending loans to the owner. As cash flows are lower than stated, the borrower struggles to maintain the property and repairs are neglected. By the time the commercial loans are in default, the lender is often left with dilapidated or difficult-to-rent commercial property. Many of the methods of committing mortgage fraud that are found in residential real estate are also present in commercial loan fraud.

Air loans: This is a nonexistent property loan where there is usually no collateral. Air loans involve brokers who invent borrowers and properties, establish accounts for payments, and maintain custodial accounts for escrows. They may establish an office with a bank of telephones, each one used as the fake employer, appraiser, credit agency, etc., to fraudulently deceive creditors who attempt to verify information on loan applications.

Original published at https://dankrell.com

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Disclaimer. This article is not intended to provide nor should it be relied upon for legal and financial advice. Readers should not rely solely on the information contained herein, as it does not purport to be comprehensive or render specific advice. Readers should consult with an attorney regarding local real estate laws and customs as they vary by state and jurisdiction. Using this article without permission is a violation of copyright laws.

August 13, 2017December 13, 2022

Improving home buyer credit scores

There’s been a lot of anticipation about the new credit scoring model by VantageScore (vantagescore.com). It’s supposed to increase the availability of credit to many consumers. Launching this fall, VantageScore 4.0 is touted to be a more accurate scoring system that uses trending data instead of “snapshots.” This credit scoring system is also supposed to help those with limited credit, and incorporates the improved credit reporting standards included in the National Consumer Assistance Plan. This and other new scoring systems have a lot of promise, but will improving home buyer credit scores help the mortgage process?

Let’s take a step back to see how home buyer credit scores reporting has evolved in recent years. The National Consumer Assistance Plan (nationalconsumerassistanceplan.com) was launched in 2015 as a result of an agreement between the credit reporting agencies (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion) and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. The agreement stemmed from Schneiderman’s investigation into the credit reporting agencies’ practices including (but not limited to) the accuracy of collected data, the practices in handling consumer disputes, and the reporting of medical debt.

The National Consumer Assistance Plan’s focus is to improve the consumer’s experience as well as increase data quality and accuracy. Consumers will have increased information related to credit report disputes, including instructions on what to do if they’re dissatisfied with the result of their dispute. Additionally, there is an “enhanced dispute resolution process” for fraud victims.

Among the many changes made by the National Consumer Assistance Plan to increase accuracy and quality of data includes: issuing consistent standards for those who report data to the credit agencies; medical debt won’t be reported during a 180-day waiting period so as to allow for insurance payments to catch up with billing; and the elimination of reporting of debts that were not contractual (such as parking tickets).

From The National Consumer Assistance Plan:

Consumers visiting www.annualcreditreport.com, the website that allows consumers to obtain a free credit report once a year will see expanded educational material.
Consumers who obtain their free annual credit report and dispute information resulting in modification of the disputed item will be able to obtain another free annual report without waiting a year.
Consumers who dispute items on their credit reports will receive additional information from the credit reporting agencies along with the results of their dispute, including a description of what they can do if they are not satisfied with the outcome of their dispute.
The credit reporting agencies (CRAs) are focusing on an enhanced dispute resolution process for victims of identity theft and fraud, as well as those who may have credit information belonging to another consumer on their file, commonly called a “mixed file.”
Medical debts won’t be reported until after a 180-day “waiting period” to allow insurance payments to be applied. The CRAs will also remove from credit reports previously reported medical collections that have been or are being paid by insurance.
Consistent standards will be reinforced by the credit bureaus to lenders and others that submit data for inclusion in a credit report (data furnishers).
Data furnishers will be prohibited from reporting authorized users without a date of birth and the CRAs will reject data that does not comply with this requirement.
The CRAs will eliminate the reporting of debts that did not arise from a contract or agreement by the consumer to pay, such as traffic tickets or fines.
A multi-company working group of the nationwide consumer credit reporting companies has been formed to regularly review and help ensure consistency and uniformity in the data submitted by data furnishers for inclusion in a consumer’s credit report.

Recent credit reporting changes are sure to make an impact for home buyer credit scores. But, you may still have impaired credit that would make it difficult for you to buy a home. So how can you improve your home buying process? Be proactive!

A credit report contains a lot of information about you. It reveals your personal information, including where you’ve lived and worked. It indicates the credit cards and other loans you have, and how you pay on them. It may also include any collection activity against you, as well as bankruptcies, liens or judgements. Know what’s being reported about you by obtaining your free annual credit report (annualcreditreport.com) and dispute discrepancies. Successful disputes should improve your credit score.

However, if your home buyer credit scores are impaired as the result of poor habits, don’t despair. You can improve your credit report and score on your own by creating “good” credit habits. First: make sure you pay your bills on time. Planning specific times each month to pay bills will make it hard to miss a payment. Second: reducing credit card balances may improve your credit score. And third: be mindful of how many credit cards you maintain. Having too many credit cards could lower your credit score. Also, be careful to not apply for too much credit at any given time, as these “inquiries” could lower your score as well.

To learn more how a credit report functions, affects you, and how improve your home buyer credit scores, visit the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (consumerfinance.gov), the Federal Trade Commission (ftc.gov), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC.gov).

Original published at https://dankrell.com/blog/2017/08/13/improving-home-buyer-credit-scores

By Dan Krell
Copyright© 2017

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April 14, 2017December 13, 2022

Demand better consumer financial protection

In an effort to reform the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (consumerfinance.gov) to become a better steward of consumer protection, H.R.5983 – Financial CHOICE Act of 2016 was introduced during the last congress. The effort to compel oversight on the now embattled agency, as well as provide for a panel of decision makers (in lieu of a single chairperson), is unfortunately highly politicized. As financial consumers, we should demand a better and fair protection agency serving without political motive.

From the Executive Summary of the The Financial CHOICE Act
Creating Hope and Opportunity for Investors, Consumers and Entrepreneurs:

SECTION THREE: Empower Americans to achieve financial independence by fundamentally reforming the CFPB and protecting investors.
Change the name of the CFPB to the “Consumer Financial Opportunity Commission(CFOC),” and task it with the dual mission of consumer protection and competitive markets, with a cost-benefit analysis of rules performed by an Office of Economic Analysis.
Replace the current single director with a bipartisan, five-member commission which is subject to congressional oversight and appropriations.
Establish an independent, Senate-confirmed Inspector General.
Require the Commission obtain permission before collecting personally identifiable information on consumers.
Repeal authority to ban bank products or services it deems “abusive” and its authority to prohibit arbitration.
Repeal indirect auto lending guidance.

Some have hailed the CFPB because it was created out of good intention. There is no question that the CFPB has done a great job in collecting and publicizing consumer complaints. The announcements of consumer complaints seem to be a public airing of consumer grievances, which sometimes signaled forthcoming action from the agency in a specific financial sector.

However, critics contend that the CFPB rules have made lending more burdensome for both lenders and consumers by increasing bureaucratic red tape. It has also increased the cost of lending to consumers by adding levels of compliance measures that are now embedded within the lending process. Critics have also complained that the CFPB’s enforcement is not fair and unequal in focus.

Critics are becoming increasingly vocal, not only because of the sometimes invasive rule making, but more recently of how offenders are chosen and penalized. Jacob Gaffney’s article for HousingWire (Former CFPB attorney pretty much just confirmed the worst fears of the mortgage industry: housingwire.com; January 3, 2017) earlier this year discussed two genuine concerns about the CFPB:

1) “The CFPB targets lenders for enforcement action based on opaque internal decisioning;” and
2) “Monetary penalties seemed determined by revenue, not equalitarian application of said enforcement action.”

Gaffney quoted Ronald Rubin, a former enforcement attorney at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, (from a December 21^st 2016 piece “The Tragic Downfall of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” published online nationalreview.com) as confirming these concerns. For example, the Wells Fargo fake consumer account scandal, one of the most egregious consumer scandals post financial crises, was not addressed by the CFPB (until it was too late) because Wells Fargo was allegedly “not a target of the agency at that time.”

Referring to the complaint database, Rubin stated:

“The CFPB’s complaint database contained grievances against almost every financial business. Enforcement targeted the companies with the most revenue…rather than those with the most complaints.” He further stated: “Targets (of the CFPB) were almost certain to write a check… Even the size of the checks didn’t depend on actual wrongdoing — during investigations, Enforcement demanded targets’ financial statements to calculate the maximum fines they could afford to pay.”

The recent PHH Corp v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau case highlighted some of the alleged abuse of power by an agency with no oversight. US Appellate Judge Kavanaugh wrote in his opinion:

“That combination of power that is massive in scope, concentrated in a single person, and unaccountable to the President triggers the important constitutional question at issue in this case…
…This is a case about executive power and individual liberty. The U.S. Government’s executive power to enforce federal law against private citizens – for example, to bring criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions – is essential to societal order and progress, but simultaneously a grave threat to individual liberty.”

We’ve followed the career of the CFPB since it was established in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Shortly after the financial crisis, we eagerly anticipated the new agency to help those who were the target of abusive lending and foreclosure practices. Since its inception, however, controversy has embraced the agency.

By Dan Krell
Copyright© 2017

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February 10, 2017December 19, 2019

Make housing great again

When President Trump was campaigning, one of his talking points was to “dismantle” Dodd-Frank. And after a couple of weeks in office, it seems that it’s next on his “to do” list. While many are already touting the move as controversial and partisan, the reality is that it’s a bipartisan issue. Even Barney Frank was seen on CNBC this past Sunday admitting that his namesake legislation needs reform (video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000590611). Reforming Dodd-Frank will make housing great again.

Dodd-Frank is the nickname for Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The purpose, as described in its title, was to “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”

Dodd-Frank changed the housing industry dramatically. Besides altering the process of financing and buying homes, critics have claimed that the legislation has also restricted lending.

Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; which creates and enforces rules and regulations for consumer financial markets. Besides adding new home buyer and seller disclosures as well as timelines, the “Know Before You Owe” rule changed the home buying process by creating a new level of bureaucracy embedded within the mortgage lending process.

Many critics of the CFPB also claim that it has too much power with little oversight, and point to last year’s Appellate opinion on PHH Corp v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as confirmation for necessary reforms., where Judge Kavanaugh wrote:

“…the Director of the CFPB possesses enormous power over American business, American consumers, and the overall U.S. economy. The Director unilaterally enforces 19 federal consumer protection statutes, covering everything from home finance to student loans to credit cards to banking practices. The Director alone decides what rules to issue; how to enforce, when to enforce, and against whom to enforce the law; and what sanctions and penalties to impose on violators of the law…That combination of power that is massive in scope, concentrated in a single person, and unaccountable to the President triggers the important constitutional question at issue in this case.”

One of the unintended consequences of Dodd-Frank was the restricted lending atmosphere in the mortgage industry. Besides the overwhelming increase in rules and regulations as a result of Dodd-Frank, there has also been insufficient private portfolio and securitization of mortgages; which further limits access of funding to many home buyers.

Prior to the financial crisis, private mortgage securitization was prevalent; which provided a multitude of lending products, including “Alt-A” and subprime. The wide access to private mortgage funding contributed to the homeownership rate to peak close to 70 percent (The most recent homeownership rate reported by the US Census was 63.7 percent, a forty year low). Since the crisis, a majority (estimates were as high as 95 percent) of mortgages are insured or purchased by the government.

Before the financial crisis, Alt-A and subprime mortgages were widely available to give home buyers options to finance their homes, especially when they didn’t fit the underwriting guidelines for a conventional loan. Many of these home buyers were self-employed or small business owners, whose financial picture was outside of the box of the requirements for a conventional mortgage.

Of course, FHA is an alternative to conventional mortgages. FHA has lenient underwriting guidelines, like subprime mortgages; but is insured by the government. However, the upfront and annual mortgage insurance premiums can be hefty. Alt-A and subprime can seem more attractive when purchasing a home beyond the FHA loan limits, and/or when documentation becomes onerous.

Back in 2001, Federal Reserve Board Economist Liz Laderman wrote about the growth of subprime through the 1990’s (Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital Markets; FRBSF Economic Letter; December 28, 2001).

“An increase in access to the capital markets through loan securitization also contributed to growth in subprime lending in the 1990s. Securitization is the repackaging, pooling, and reselling of loans to investors as securities. It increases liquidity and funding to an industry both by reducing risk—through pooling—and by more efficiently allocating risk to the investors most willing to bear it. Investors had already become comfortable with securitized prime mortgage loans, and subprime mortgage loans were among various other types of credit, such as multifamily residential mortgage loans, automobile loans, and manufactured home loans, that began to be securitized in the 1990s. Through securitization, the subprime mortgage market strengthened its links with the broader capital markets, thereby increasing the flow of funds into the market and encouraging competition.”

Of course, Dr. Laderman also points out that the increased competition in the subprime market was a concern due to reported abusive lending practices. However, she concluded:

“…subprime mortgage lending grew rapidly in the 1990s to become an important segment of both the home purchase and home equity mortgage markets. Evidence pertaining to securitization and pricing of subprime mortgages also suggests that the subprime market has become well linked with the broader capital markets, an important first step in the development of a fully competitive environment.”

A 2006 article by Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross (The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review; Vol. 88, No. 1) described the history of subprime mortgages. The authors stated:

..Because of its complicated nature, subprimelending is simultaneously viewed as having greatpromise and great peril…

Through it’s history, subprime lending has had crises where this lending sector took pauses to reflect on missteps. Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross described a “retrenchment” of subprime lending in the late 1990’s; but during that time, the facts point to huge losses in the subprime sector due to seemingly rampant illegal flipping and fraud.

Private mortgage funding isn’t entirely Alt-A or subprime mortgages, although there’s a place for responsible Alt-A and subprime lending. Prior to the growth in securitizing these types of mortgages, banks and financial institutions privately held (portfolio) these loans which increased their institutional risk and provided incentive for originating performing loans.

How can Dodd-Frank be reformed? One only has to look back to the S&L crisis of the 1980’s and listen to William K. Black. Black was the Director of Litigation for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the aftermath of the S&L crisis. His conclusions included a list of “Lessons not Learned.” The focus of his list was fraud and ethics. Black discussed curbing “control fraud” (fraud perpetrated by CEOs as well as those who are in power) and other types of fraud. He wrote The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One: How Corporate Executives and Politicians Looted the S&L Industry first published in 2005, but was recently updated.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Black reemerged after the financial crisis to provide testimony to Congress, including testimony in 2010 to the Committee on Financial Services United States House of Representatives regarding “Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner.” In a 2010 interview with Bill Moyers (pbs.org/moyers/journal/04232010/transcript1.html), Black discussed CDO’s (collateralized debt obligations), fraud, and their role in the recent crisis. And although many, including the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, cited failures in the financial system as cause for the financial crisis; they all fall short in seeing William K. Black’s “control fraud” in action – Fraud was the vehicle that drove the unrelenting greed in the CDO and mortgage markets.

With regard to housing, there is much potential for reform within Dodd-Frank. However, maybe begin with SEC. 941 “Regulation Of Credit Risk Retention” of Dodd-Frank. SEC.941 requires a securitizer of residential mortgages to have skin in the game by retaining some of the risk of any asset or mortgage backed security that is sold, transferred, or conveyed. Additionally, the securitizer is prohibited from hedging or transferring their credit risk. Exceptions to this section include federal programs insuring or guaranteeing mortgages; which includes FHA and VA mortgages, as well as mortgages from institutions supervised by the Farm Credit Administration (including the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation). However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not exempt.

The President can make housing great again by incentivising private investment in the mortgage industry either through increasing portfolio and/or private securitization in the mortgage markets – along with reducing fraud (and control fraud) while ensuring responsible lending practices. Private investment in mortgage funding will open the doors for many home buyers and increase homeownership rates.

By Dan Krell
Copyright © 2017

Original published at https://dankrell.com/blog/2017/02/10/make-housing-great/

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January 27, 2017July 13, 2019

FHA mortgage insurance facts

There’s been a lot of reporting on FHA mortgages lately, creating some confusion. Of course I’m referring to the controversy surrounding FHA’s annual mortgage insurance premium (also known as MIP). Many were surprised to hear that one of the outgoing directives of the Obama administration was to lower the FHA MIP. And, eleven days later, many were just as surprised to hear that the new Trump administration reversed that directive. So what are the FHA Mortgage Insurance Facts?

FHA Mortgage Insurance Facts

Mortgagee Letter 2017-01, dated January 9, 2017 described revisions to the annual MIP for “certain” FHA loans. The effective date of the revisions was to be January 27^th. Meaning, that FHA mortgages that closed and/or disbursed on or after January 27^th would have had the lower MIP. Although the general reporting was that borrowers would save an average of $500 per year (an average of about $41 per month), the actual savings would have depended on the amount borrowed, term of loan and loan-to-value (percentage of loan amount to home value).

Additionally, the lower MIP would have been on new loans that were to have been disbursed (closed) on or after January 27^th. Contrary to some reporting (and more reporting and more reporting) and social media postings, existing FHA loans would not have benefited from the lowered the MIP. Also, the reduction was suspended before the effective date, so MIP did not increase for new mortgages.

The rational stated in Mortgagee Letter 2017-01 (Purpose and Background sections) for the lower MIP was that FHA has met the obligation to its Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMIF). The MMIF covers lender losses on FHA mortgages. Historically, HUD has adjusted the MIP (by increasing or decreasing MIP) as needed to meet the MMIF mandated requirements. HUD’s last FHA MIP reduction occurred in 2015. The November 15, 2016 Federal Housing Administration Annual Report to Congress reported that the MMIF increased from the previous year and the Fund’s capital ratio was 2.32 percent (above the 2 percent minimum capital reserve requirement). The Report did not signal any impending reduction to the MIP this year.

Some have talked about FHA mortgage insurance facts to include budget juggling and over projecting to make the MMIF appear solvent. Consider that the MMIF pre-crisis reserve ratio was well above the minimum 2 percent but needed about $1.7 billion to replenish reserves after the crisis. When the FHA MIP was reduced in 2015, many testified to congress about the potential risks. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President of the American Action Forum provided such testimony February 26, 2015 to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance “The Future of Housing in America: Oversight of the Federal Housing Administration, Part II.” Holtz-Eakin provided data stating:

Adding to concern surrounding premium reductions, FHA’s recent history has been plagued by missed projections. These missed projections enhance the perception that FHA downplays risks borne by taxpayers and cast doubt on the assumption that FHA will continually improve as projected despite cutting annual premiums. Since FY 2009, FHA’s capital ratio has been below the 2 percent minimum mandated by Congress. FHA has repeatedly projected marked improvement only to miss its targets…

In every actuarial review since 2003, the economic value of FHA’s MMIF has come in lower than what was projected the previous year …While FHA has in the past pointed to programs like home equity conversion mortgages (HECM) or the prevalence of seller-funded down payment assistance for losses greater than anticipated, erroneous economic assumptions and volume forecasts are more frequently to blame.

Following the dramatic fall in FHA’s economic value shown in Table 1, legislative attempts to reform FHA in the last Congress would have raised its mandated capital ratio even higher. Reform proposals have included a new capital ratio of either 3 percent or 4 percent, levels FHA’s MMIF is not expected to reach until 2018 and 2019 respectively before factoring in the effects of premium reductions. FHA’s capital buffer is meant to protect taxpayers in an economic downturn while preserving FHA’s ability to fulfill its mission; its restoration is critical. Furthermore, many rightly worry that FHA’s current economic value is overstated due to the influx of money from major mortgage‐related legal settlements and the one-time appropriation of $1.7 billion from the Treasury Department ..

An example of budgetary juggling is hinted by HUD Secretary Julián Castro in his July 13, 2016 oral testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services Hearing on “HUD Accountability.” In his statement earlier this year, he attributed the health of FHA’s MMIF to HUD’s Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (The DASP was put into place to help troubled home owners who were at risk of default, as well as dealing with delinquent and defaulted mortgages):

“…And when you consider that DASP has contributed more than $2 billion to the MMI Fund above what would’ve otherwise been collected, it’s clear this innovative program is a significant reason why the Fund’s capital reserve ratio is now above its 2 percent requirement.”

Of course, FHA mortgage insurance facts include changes to DASP. This would most likely reduce contributions to the MMIF. A HUD press release outlines those changes (FHA Announces Most Significant Improvements to Date for Distressed Notes Sales Program; June 30, 2016):

In addition, FHA’s latest enhancements prohibit investors from abandoning low-value properties in high-foreclosure neighborhoods to prevent blight. FHA is also offering greater opportunity for non-profit organizations, local governments and other governmental entities to participate in DASP. Loans are not eligible to be sold through DASP unless and until all FHA loss mitigation efforts are exhausted. On average, mortgages sold through this sales program are 29 months delinquent at the time of the auction.

One of the FHA mortgage insurance facts is that FHA is supposed to be self-funded through its MMIF. Suspending the MIP reduction may be to assure the longevity of FHA to future home buyers. In suspending the MIP reduction, Mortgagee Letter 2017-07 stated (Background section): “FHA is committed to ensuring its mortgage insurance programs remains viable and effective in the long term for all parties involved, especially our taxpayers. As such, more analysis and research are deemed necessary to assess future adjustments while also considering potential market conditions …”

Original published at https://dankrell.com/blog/2017/01/27/fha-mortgage-insurance-premium-facts/

By Dan Krell
Copyright © 2017

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